Publications and Articles

This article is based on work with the National Network for Ocean and Climate Change Interpretation and the Visualizing Change Projects funded by NSF and NOAA, respectively.  The ideas reflected here are expanded from a presentation at the 2015 ASTC Conference in Montreal, in a session titled: “Innovation in Climate Change Education: Six ways to Solutions.”

The Gulf of Maine is one of the fastest warming marine areas on the planet: The industries and creatures that call it home face an unprecedented shift in their interactions and existence. Scientists, policy makers, and practitioners often want to communicate to the public about the seriousness of the situation to encourage mitigation and adaptation. Many standard communication strategies that rely on fear and scientific authority alone—rather than comprehensive explanations that include solutions—can leave audiences feeling overwhelmed and disengaged, instead of hopeful and motivated to act. In this practice bridge, we showcase a social science research-based climate change communication “tool-kit” for the Gulf of Maine, using one example for each climate driver addressed at the Gulf of Maine 2050 Symposium (temperature and circulation: lobster fisheries; coastal and ocean acidification: seagrass restoration; sea-level rise: coastal development). Communication models that involve the head (understanding of climate change), heart (hope through agency and efficacy), and hands (intentions to participate in community action) further engagement in climate change conversations. We explain the research behind our communication framework, enabling practitioners to extend this case study to their own work.

Environmental work is emotionally laden because of the struggle on behalf of ethical positions and the daily experience of loss and frustration. Such ongoing stressful experiences may be understood better within a trauma-based framework that acknowledges their implications, similar to clinical diagnosis and treatment of acute stress disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. This paper reports on two studies of the emotional experience of environmentalists, conservationists, and environmental educators working with profound awareness of how current human behavior is degrading the environment, some would say beyond recovery. It explores the question of whether these environmentally aware workers may suffer from a subtype of acute stress disorder and posttraumatic sequelae. The results suggest that there is reason to believe this subtype exists and is mediated by cortical assessments of salience and urgency. This paper suggests results that are ominous for mental health professionals—that indicators of depression, anxiety, and enervation are significantly elevated in those arguably most needed to help society come to terms with the problems we face in a degrading biosphere. We conclude that mental health professionals are urgently needed to help those who are at risk of becoming debilitated by their knowledge of the consequences of human impact on the planet and recommend that these professionals work to develop a new language, context, and treatment for this subtype condition.

Reasons for lack of public engagement in climate change are reviewed with a particular focus on the lack of discourse about climate change. Discourse is important because it is through discussions that the public comes to understand climate change and it is a core component to the development of both laws and policies. In the case of climate change, a core challenge is to encourage public discussion grounded in scientific knowledge in order to develop publically acceptable laws and policies that are significant enough to address the scale and root causes of the problem. We review previous research, collect survey data to identify areas of knowledge where public education is most needed, and examine the role of climate change concern, perceived ability to discuss the issue, and social norms on the public’s reluctance to talk about climate change. After discussing the public’s knowledge and these psychological barriers that influence the content and likelihood of discourse on climate change, we describe a program designed to encourage scientifically grounded discussions about climate change at informal science learning centers such as zoos and aquariums.

Previous research suggests that many who are concerned about climate change self-silence on the topic; failing to engage in regular discussion about climate change despite their desires to do so. This research examines how a communication training program for environmental educators working at aquariums, zoos, and national parks might boost this population’s willingness to discuss climate change with visitors via increasing hope. Using hope theory, we examined whether changes in the two components of hope – agency (the will; sense of successful determination) and pathways (the ways; the perception that one can generate a diversity of routes to one’s goal, even when encountering barriers) – mediated increases in participants’ self-reported discussion of climate change following the training program. Participants (environmental educators; N = 211) completed surveys before, immediately after (mediators only), and six months following (outcome only) a training program. Although having greater agency predicted frequency of climate change discussions (i.e., at the between-person level), (within-person) increases in agency did not lead to increases in discussion or mediate the effect of the intervention on discussion. Instead, increases in pathways thinking mediated the effect of the intervention on increased discussion. Our results indicate that, at least among those who already have the desire to discuss climate change more, interventions which instill hope toward such discussions, and specifically, focus on building a greater variety of methods of engaging in the discussions and responding to obstacles (i.e., pathways thinking), have the potential to promote more extensive public discourse on the topic.

Given the severity of the threat posed by climate change, why is large-scale societal action to decarbonize our energy systems not more widespread? The present article examines four categories of psychological barriers to accurate risk perceptions and engagement with this topic by the public. First, psychological barriers such as (a) not personally experiencing the threat, (b) not hearing people talk about climate change, (c) being limited by cultural narratives, and (d) not understanding how climate change works can lead to misperception of the threat posed by climate change. Second, individuals may lack knowledge or perceived ability about how to address the threat. Third, social barriers such as social norms not to act and socio-structural barriers can discourage climate change engagement. Finally, worldviews such as neoliberal ideology and conspiratorial worldviews can conflict with climate change engagement.

Meeting sustainability goals will be fostered by public acceptance and engagement with sustainable development. Yet, there is little baseline knowledge about how lay individuals conceptualize different aspects of sustainability. In the present chapter, we explore possibilities for lay individuals’ mental models of sustainability, using the three-pillar sustainability framework as a reference point. First, we consider how individuals could perceive pairs of pillars (e.g., social and environmental sustainability) to be either complementary or in tension with one another. Then, we use balance theory to explore implications of these perceived dyadic relations for mental models of how all three pillars interrelate. We conclude by discussing directions for additional research and communication outreach.

Despite the importance of interpersonal public communication about climate change, most citizens rarely discuss the topic. In two studies, we find that inaccurate perceptions of others’ opinions (i.e. pluralistic ignorance) contribute to self-silencing among those concerned about climate change. Study 1 illustrates that those who are aware of others’ concern about climate change report greater willingness to discuss the issue than those with inaccurate perceptions of others’ opinions. Study 2 demonstrates that correcting pluralistic ignorance increases concerned participants’ willingness to discuss climate change. In both studies, pluralistic ignorance leads to self-silencing because perceptions that others do not share one’s opinion are associated with expecting to be perceived as less competent in a conversation about climate change. In contrast to previous research on confronting prejudice, in the present research expectations about being disliked did not explain self-silencing. We discuss the implications for self-silencing and promoting interpersonal communication about climate change.

Public support for climate policy is necessary to enact the large-scale changes needed to mitigate climate change. We use the three-pillar model of sustainability as a conceptual framework to examine how individuals evaluate climate policies and how these evaluations predict policy support. We consider individuals’ evaluations of 1) environmental impacts (i.e., perceived policy effectiveness), 2) economic impacts, and 3) social impacts of policies. We use multilevel modeling to disentangle variance in policy support attributable to between-person differences (i.e., aggregated policy support) and within-person variations across policies. First, we fit a multilevel factor model to our dataset (Nobs = 1056) to identify whether the factor structure of the three-pillar model at both the between-person and within-person levels of analysis. The three-pillar model emerged at the within-person level. In contrast, items instead loaded onto two factors at the between-person level: benefits and harms. Thus, we created within- and between-person constructs matching these factors. Results from multilevel regressions suggest that a) individuals who anticipate more benefits and fewer harms of climate policies (as a set) also tend to report greater aggregated support for climate change policies, and b) anticipating environmental benefits, economic impacts and social impacts to be above average for a certain policy (relative to other policies) predicts greater support for that policy. Our work suggests the relevance of differentiating between who is most likely to support climate policies in general (i.e., between-person differences) as well as policy-specific evaluations associated with support for some policies over others (i.e. within-person variation in support).

This research examines the extent to which four anticipatory emotional reactions (hope, anxiety, helplessness, and boredom) that arise when contemplating participating in public-sphere climate action predict intentions to engage in such action. In a large, geographically diverse sample of American adults visiting informal science learning centers (e.g., zoos, aquariums; N = 4964), stronger feelings of hope robustly predicted greater intentions to act (η2p = .22, a large effect); whereas stronger feelings of boredom robustly predicted decreased intention to act (η2p = .09, a medium effect). Both of these feelings had significantly more predictive power than political orientation (η2p = .04, a small-to-medium effect). The extent to which respondents felt anxious or helpless was not strongly correlated with their intentions to take action (η2ps ≈ 0.01, a small effect). These findings highlight the underexplored connection between how people feel when they contemplate taking climate action and their intentions to engage in such action.

Interpersonal discussions about climate change among the public are important for creating positive social change to addressing the issue, yet a majority of the public does not regularly discuss the topic. Previous correlational research connects avoidance of climate change discussions to low efficacy about these discussions. The present research tests whether a knowledge-based intervention which 1) uses evidence-based communication techniques to increase science knowledge and 2) highlights community-level solutions can promote public discussion through improving efficacy beliefs. A lab experiment (N = 173) with university students and a field quasi-experiment with two nationally representative samples of visitors to informal science learning centers (e.g., aquariums, Na = 1068, Nb = 907) demonstrates that those that received a knowledge-based intervention (vs. those who do not receive this intervention) report higher efficacy beliefs, which subsequently enhance engagement in climate change discussion. Our results suggest the potential for national-level knowledge-based interventions which improve efficacy beliefs to catalyze public engagement.

Using the head, heart, and hands model, we examined a training program designed to catalyze national public engagement with climate change through informal science learning centers (e.g., aquariums, zoos). Survey data were collected from visitors (N = 7,285) observing 1,101 presentations at 117 U.S. institutions before and after presenters participated in communication training. Visitors who attended posttraining (vs. pretraining) presentations reported greater understanding of climate change (head), hope (heart), and intentions to engage in community action (hands). As hypothesized, results suggested these changes were due to an increase in presenters’ discussion of climate change and use of effective communication techniques.

There are broad differences in popularity amongst different policies designed to address climate change. Across two studies, we explore systematic preferences across three policy attributes: 1) who is targeted: business versus individuals, 2) what is targeted: energy supply versus energy demand, and 3) how change is motivated: incentives versus disincentives. Additionally, in Study 2, we examine whether perceptions of policy impacts along the three pillars of sustainability (environment, economic, and social) can explain the effect of these policy attributes on the lay public’s policy preferences. First, participants preferred policies that a) attempt to change the energy supply by changing the source of energy (e.g., more renewable energy) over policies that attempt to reduce the demand by reducing energy use (e.g., encourage energy efficiency). Second, participants preferred policies using incentives over policies using disincentives, especially when considering policies that targeted individuals (vs. businesses). The latter suggests that participants were more tolerant of the use of disincentives for businesses than individuals. Participants’ expectations about policy consequences explained these patterns of preferences: Preferred types of policies were expected to have the most environmental benefits (suggesting that the policies would be effective) and the most net-positive economic and social impacts.

We document the gendered nature and valence of stereotypes about each of the Six Americas climate change opinion groups that represent a continuum of climate change opinions from Dismissive to Alarmed. Results primarily supported predictions. First, the more groups were associated with strong concern about climate change, the more feminine they were perceived to be. Second, groups with strong concern or strong lack of concern were seen the most negatively. However, contrary to expectations, greater concern was also associated with more positive masculine traits. Combining effects, most perceived the Dismissive to have negative masculine traits and not to have positive feminine traits, those with intermediate opinions (especially, those who were Cautious and Concerned) most favorably, and the Alarmed to have both positive masculine and negative feminine traits. Ratings suggest that (a) the Dismissive may be seen as being “bad but bold”, (b) the Cautious and Concerned may be seen as liked but not respected, and (c) the Alarmed may be seen as respected but not liked. Thus, ratings indicate the importance of attending to gendered and ambivalent impressions of group. Third, valence of impressions was moderated by perceivers’ personal concern about climate change in a manner consistent with intergroup biases. Findings lay the groundwork for understanding the influence of impressions of opinion groups on, for example, willingness to endorse opinions, associate with opinion groups, and support or oppose climate change action.

The present paper tests the validity of using a single-item individual difference measure of climate change concern derived from the “Six Americas” project’s descriptions of the US public’s concern about climate change. The “Six Americas” project identified six segments of the US population proposed to range from the most (i.e. Alarmed) to least Concerned (i.e. Dismissive). The order is also proposed to relate to issue involvement with those in the middle of the continuum least involved. Three studies support the reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity of self-categorization into the six segments as a single-item individual difference measure of climate change concern. Results support both a linear relation with concern about climate change and a curvilinear relation with issue involvement. These findings suggest that the single-item self-categorization measure developed for use in this manuscript is a valid and concise measure for researchers to assess participants’ opinions about climate change.

The status of climate change education at nature-based museums (i.e., zoos, aquariums and nature centers) was examined, with a particular focus on centers participating in a National Network for Ocean and Climate Change Interpretation (NNOCCI) leadership training program. Study 1 revealed that, relative to nature-based museums that did not participate in the training, NNOCCI-participating institutions provided resources for staff to work on the topic and professional development programs and were more likely than non-participating museums to be comfortable with and provide climate change education programming. Study 2 confirms these results via visitor reports about the exhibits they observed. Study 2 also reveals that, relative to non-visitors and visitors to non-participating nature-based museums, visitors to NNOCCI-participating nature-based museums were more knowledgeable about and concerned about climate change and ocean acidification, hopeful about their ability to talk about the topic, and likely to engage in climate change actions than those who did not visit these centers. Importantly, results from both studies indicate that nature-based museums, especially NNOCCI participating museums, have an institutional culture supportive of climate science education and suggests that NNOCCI interpreter training programming facilitates this culture which in turn is reflected in visitor engagement.

We suggest that policies will be less popular when individuals personally have to pay for them rather than when others have to pay (i.e., a Not Out of My Bank Account or NOMBA effect). Dual process models of persuasion suggest that personally having to pay would motivate scrutiny of persuasive messages making it essential to use effective science communication tactics when using climate science to support climate change policies. A pilot experiment (N = 186) and main study (N = 758) support a NOMBA effect with less policy support (Pilot study) and lower recommended fees (Main study) for a policy that would require participants, rather than another group, to pay a fee for community solar panels. Consistent with dual process models and suggesting systematic processing, only when participants would have to pay the fee, messages using strong (vs. weak) science communication tactics increased support for policies (Pilot study), increased the favorability of thoughts about the policy (Main study) and these thoughts subsequently predicted policy support (Main study). Inconsistent with propositions that information about expert sources would be a heuristic or bolster science messages, expert consensus information did not influence thoughts or policy support in any study condition. Efforts to understand climate change policy support would benefit from attending to research on dual process models of persuasion, including understanding how different types and degree of outcome relevance can alter how

Political marches are one of the most public and vocal means of engaging in collective action and can potentially build social movements by increasing the likelihood that bystanders become engaged with the social movement. Here, we conduct a trend study to test the impacts of two back-to-back highly visible large-scale climate change related marches on bystanders, targeting psychological drivers of collective action: efficacy beliefs, perceptions of others’ climate change activism and concerns, impressions of marchers, and behavioral intentions. Participants either completed a survey the day before the March for Science (n = 302) or several days after the People’s Climate March, which occurred a week after the first march (n = 285). Results suggest that the marches were at least partially effective: bystanders’ (a) collective efficacy beliefs and (b) impressions of marchers improved after the march. In contrast, marches were ineffective in increasing perceptions of others’ engagement with concern about climate change. We anticipated that political leaning of bystanders’ news sources would moderate effects of marches. Unexpectedly, collective efficacy beliefs improved among consumers of conservative, but not liberal, news. This unanticipated result is consistent with the notion that conservative news sources dedicated less coverage than liberal news sources to the marches prior to the marches (potentially leading to lower collective efficacy among those who consumed these sources), but that coverage afterwards was more equal across ideological bias of news sources. We also found that the more conservative the news sources consumed by an individual, the more negative impressions they had of marchers, and this relation was strongest among those that indicated, after the marches, that they had heard about the marches. These results on impressions are consistent with the notion that, when marches were covered, conservative news sources portrayed marchers relatively more negatively than liberal news sources. Overall, results suggest that marches can increase the likelihood that bystanders will participate in social movements via changes in psychological drivers of participation and the effects will likely depend upon political leanings of news sources via both whether sources mention the marches and how the sources cover the marches.

The present paper examines the role of conversations in improving public engagement in climate change, and discusses how to improve these conversations by grounding them in climate science and by using tools identified in empirical research on climate change messaging. We review empirical findings on how messages can be optimized to increase their “spreadability” (i.e. messages that are most likely to be understood, remembered, and repeated from one person to another) and influence engagement climate change action. After describing general communication strategies, we present a specific example of the development, teaching, and use of these messages among educators at informal science learning centers, and research evaluating the impact of this training on educators’ conversations with their social contacts (colleagues, friends and family). The results of this research indicate that, due to educators’ frequency and use of strategies taught in the training, their social contacts’ understanding of climate change improved, as did their hope about their ability to address climate change. These improvements were positively associated with the likelihood that the social contacts engaged in group-based pro-environmental actions, including talking about climate change, and therefore increased the spread of the message.

Addressing complex global issues – such as alterations in nutrient cycles, climate change, large-scale drought, widespread erosion, and new disease vectors – require adaptive changes in our collective behavior and policies. To date, approaches to advancing science literacy to address such challenges have generally failed to produce sufficient changes in behavior at the necessary scale. We suggest that past interventions have come up short due to a primary focus on individual change, rather than change that results that accrue in the small groups that are a basis for affiliation, social and cultural capital, and the domain where impacts tend to be replicated by others. Importantly, these are the same communities where scientific literacies are negotiated and grown. The authors illustrate the unique authority and social position that museums hold to activate such small groups toward solutions at a civic scale capable of matching scale of action to need.

The National Network for Ocean and Climate Change Interpretation (NNOCCI) is comprised of interpreters, educators, social scientists, climate scientists, and organizations working together in a thriving community of practice focused on creating social change through dialogue and public engagement in climate solutions. Since 2011, the community has grown training programs that employ emotionally aware facilitation, a cohort model of engagement, and skills-building related to the use of strategic framing for science communication. The model helped shape a community of more than 180 informal science education institutions (ISEIs) and developed partnerships with academia throughout the United States. At this writing, the community reports training more than 38,000 informal science educators who are now reaching more than 150 million visitors each year, their colleagues in their community, and their social networks. The NNOCCI model has shown that a motivated group of communicators – equipped with effective messaging techniques and a careful growth strategy – can build a tight-knit community of practice that shares their values and concerns. NNOCCI’s consistent messaging about climate change across the country is changing public discourse to be positive, productive, solutions-focused, and supportive of community climate action.

Train-the-trainer programs are an effective method for improving educators’ content knowledge and pedagogical skills. They also offer a way to reach more educators than by traditional professional development models. This manuscript shares the results of a retrospective study conducted with a cohort of informal science educators who participated in a climate change train-the-trainer program. Using expectancy-value theory and the Professional Development Motivation Model, this study explored the components of the program to identify what contributed to the outcomes of the train-the-trainer model. The positive components included in person meetings, a paid coordinator to support the educators following the training, and evidence-based pedagogical strategies for teaching about climate change. Negative features included interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts related to learning new pedagogical strategies. A small number also felt the curriculum was not applicable to their communities. Organizations should consider these factors as they design new programs to best serve their participants.

This MessageMemo synthesizes multiple studies and outlines a practical, actionable communications strategy for building public understanding of climate change and its effects on coastal and ocean ecosystems.

This report details the results of an experimental survey of more than 7,000 registered U.S. voters that explores the extent to which values-based messages and explanatory statements affect attitudes about climate and ocean change and support for relevant policies. The experiment demonstrates the power of the values of Protection and Responsible Management to move attitudes and policy opinions about these issues in productive directions, and describes how the value of Protection is particularly powerful when paired with discussions of the human health impacts of climate change. The report also finds that Explanatory Chains—clear causal descriptions of the processes that connect determinants to outcomes—increase the effectiveness of messages. 

This report summarizes research findings on how empirically tested Explanatory Metaphors and Causal Explanations can help the public understand the complex science of Oceans and Climate Change in ways that our previous research shows is not available to them otherwise.

This report extends FrameWorks prior research on climate change and lays the groundwork for a larger reframing project by examining the differences between the ways that experts and the general public understand climate change and oceans. Data from interviews with both members of the scientific community and lay informants are compared to identify gaps in understanding that can ultimately be addressed through strategic communications. 

This evidence of effectiveness is what separates this climate communication initiative from others, according to Hannah Pickard, NNOCCI Network Manager at the New England Aquarium. “Because these recommendations were rigorously tested, and because we have an equally rigorous evaluation of their impact, we can build immediate confidence when we ask interpreters to start using them,” she said.

This impact brief tells the story of how those outcomes were achieved.

Advocates can make progress on polarized issues by finding new ways into engaging people in different perspectives, rather than trying to knock down the front door with a barrage of facts.

This feature article in the Chronicle of Philanthropy profiled the FrameWorks Institute and the way our work helps nonprofit communicators drive social change.

Building public understanding of climate change, and the political will to address it, is arguably the most important science translation effort of the century. This infographic offers the top takeaways from FrameWorks’ tested techniques for translating climate science for the public.